Points of Controversy

1.1. Of the Existence of a Personal Entity

Controverted Point: That the “person” is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.

The Eight Refutations

The First Refutation

The Fivefold Affirmative Presentation

Theravādin: Is “the person” known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is the person known in the same way as a real and ultimate fact is known?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said.

Theravādin: Acknowledge your refutation: (i) If the person be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also say, the person is known in the same way as any other real and ultimate fact is known.

(ii) That which you say here is wrong, namely, (1) that we ought to say, “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact,” but (2) we ought not to say, the person is known in the same way as any other real and ultimate fact is known.

(Suffering) If the latter statement (2) cannot be admitted, then indeed the former statement (1) should not be admitted.

(iv) In affirming the former statement (1), while (v) denying the latter (2), you are wrong.

The Fourfold Rejoinder

Puggalavādin: Is the “person” not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Theravādin: No, it is not known.

Puggalavādin: Is it unknown in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is known?

Theravādin: No, that cannot truly be said.

Puggalavādin: Acknowledge the rejoinder: (i) If the person be not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also say: not known in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is known.

(ii) That which you say here is wrong, namely, that (1) we ought to say “the person is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact,” and (2) we ought not to say: “not known in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is known.”

If the latter statement (2) cannot be admitted, then indeed the former statement (1) should not be admitted either.

In affirming (2), while denying (1), you are wrong.

The Fourfold Refutation

Puggalavādin (continues): But if you imagine we ought to affirm that (1) the person is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, but we ought not also to affirm that (2) the “person” is not known in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is known, then you, who have actually assented to the very proposition contained in that negative question, must certainly be refuted in the following manner: let us then refute you, for you are well refuted!

(i) If (1) the “person” is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should have said as well that (2) the “person” is not known in the same way as any real and ultimate fact is known.

(ii) What you affirm is false, namely, that the former statement (1) should be affirmed, but that the latter (2) should not be affirmed.

If the latter statement (2) is not to be affirmed, then neither truly can the former (1) be affirmed.

That which you say here—(1) should be affirmed, but not (2); this statement of yours is wrong.

The Fourfold Application

Puggalavādin (continues): If this be a faulty refutation, look at the parallel procedure in your own argument (Kv1.1.1). Thus, according to us (1) was true (the person is known, etc.); but (2) was not true (… known in the same way, etc.). Now we, who admitted these propositions, do not consider ourselves to have been refuted. You say you have refuted us; anyway we are not well refuted. Your argument ran that if we affirmed (1), we must also affirm (2); that if we did not admit the truth of (2), neither could we admit the truth of (1); that we were wrong in assenting to (1), while denying (2).

The Fourfold Conclusion

Puggalavādin (continues): No (I repeat), we are not to be refuted thus, (i) namely, that my proposition compels me to assent to your “known in the same way,” etc.; (ii) your pronouncement that my proposition (1) coupled with my rejection (2) is wrong; (Suffering) that if I reject (2), I must also reject (1); (iv) that I must affirm both or none. This refutation of yours is badly done. I maintain, on the other hand, that my rejoinder was well done, and that my sequel to the argument was well done.

The Second Refutation

The Fivefold Adverse Controversy

Puggalavādin: Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Theravādin: No, it is not known … continue as in Kv1.1.1, reversing the speakers, and substituting “not known” for “known”:

The Fourfold Rejoinder

Theravādin: Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: Yes … continue as in Kv1.1.2, reversing the speakers, and substituting “known” for “not known.”:

The Fourfold Refutation

Theravādin: But if you imagine we ought to affirm that “the person” is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, but that we ought not to affirm as well that the person is known in the same way as any other real and ultimate fact is known, etc … continue as in Kv1.1.3, reversing the speakers, and substituting “known” for “not known”: .

The Fourfold Application

Theravādin (continues): If this be a faulty refutation, look at the parallel procedure in your own argument (Kv1.1.6). Thus, according to us (a) was true (a person is not known, etc.); but (b) was not true (… not known in the same way, etc.). Now we, who admitted these propositions, do not consider ourselves to have been refuted, etc.

The Fourfold Conclusion

Theravādin (continues): No, I repeat, we are not to be refuted as you claim to have refuted us … wherefore your refutation was suffering done, etc.

The Third Refutation

Theravādin: Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: It is.

Theravādin: Is the person known everywhere in that sense?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said.

Theravādin: Acknowledge the refutation: If the person be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you ought to admit that the person is known in that sense everywhere. You are wrong to admit the one proposition (A) and deny the other (C). If (C) is false, (A) is also false.

The Fourth Refutation.

Theravādin: Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: It is.

Theravādin: Is the person known always in that sense?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said … continue as above, substituting “always” for “everywhere”: .

The Fifth Refutation

Theravādin: Is the person known … as in Kv1.1.11:in everything in the sense of a real and ultimate fact? continue as in Kv1.1.11, substituting “in everything” for “everywhere “: .

The Sixth Refutation

Puggalavādin: Is the person not known … otherwise as in Kv1.1.11: … everywhere in that sense? … substituting “not known” for “known”: .

The Seventh Refutation

Puggalavādin: Is the person not known … always in that sense? …

The Eighth Refutation

Puggalavādin: Is the person not known … in everything in that sense? …

Comparative Inquiry

Comparison with other Realities, simply treated.

Theravādin: Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, and is material quality also known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is material quality one thing and the person another?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said.

Theravādin: Acknowledge the refutation: If the person and material quality be each known in the sense of real and ultimate facts, then indeed, good sir, you should also have admitted that they are distinct things. You are wrong to admit the former proposition and not the latter. If the latter cannot be admitted, neither should the former be affirmed. To say that the person and material quality are both known in the sense of real and ultimate facts, but that they are not mutually distinct things, is false.

The same form of controversy is then pursued concerning fifty-five other real and ultimate facts, or aspects of them, namely—:

  • feeling
  • perception
  • coefficients (saṅkhāras)
  • consciousness;
  • the organ of sight
  • the organ of hearing
  • the organ of smell
  • the organ of taste
  • the organ of touch
  • visible object
  • sound
  • odour
  • taste
  • tangible object
  • mind (sensis communis)
  • cognizable object;
  • eye as subjective element
  • sights as subjective element
  • visual cognition as subjective element
  • ear as subjective element
  • sounds as subjective element
  • auditory cognition as subjective element
  • nose as subjective element
  • odours as subjective element
  • olfactory cognition as subjective element
  • tongue as subjective element
  • tastes as subjective element
  • gustatory cognition as subjective element
  • body as subjective element
  • touches as subjective element
  • tactile cognition as subjective element
  • mind as subjective element
  • mind-cognizing as subjective element
  • cognizables as objective element;
  • eye as controlling power
  • ear as controlling power
  • nose as controlling power
  • tongue as controlling power
  • body as controlling power
  • mind as controlling power
  • female sex as controlling power
  • male sex as controlling power
  • life as controlling power
  • pleasure as controlling power
  • pain as controlling power
  • joy as controlling power
  • grief as controlling power
  • hedonic indifference as controlling power
  • faith as controlling power
  • energy as controlling power
  • mindfulness as controlling power
  • samādhi as controlling power
  • understanding as controlling power
  • the thought: “I shall come to know the unknown” as controlling power
  • the coming to know as controlling power
  • the having known as controlling power

Puggalavādin: Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Theravādin: It is not.

Puggalavādin: Did the Exalted One say: “There is the person who works for his own good?” And is material quality known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Is material quality one thing and the person another?

Theravādin: No, that cannot be truly said.

Puggalavādin: Acknowledge this rejoinder: If the Exalted One said: “There is the person who works for his own good,” and if material quality be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also have admitted that material quality and the person are two distinct things. You are wrong in admitting the truth of the former statement while you deny that of the latter. If material quality and person are not two distinct facts, then neither can you also say that the Exalted One predicated anything concerning a “person.” Your position is false.

Theravādin: No, that cannot be truly said.

Puggalavādin: Acknowledge this rejoinder: If the Exalted One said: “There is the person who works for his own good,” and if material quality be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, good sir, you should also have admitted that material quality and the person are two distinct things. You are wrong in admitting the truth of the former statement while you deny that of the latter. If material quality and person are not two distinct facts, then neither can you also say that the Exalted One predicated anything concerning a “person.” Your position is false.

The controversy is now repeated with the successsive substitution of each of the real and ultimate facts named in Kv1.1.18Kv1.1.73 for “material quality:

Comparison with other Realities continued by Way of Analogy

Theravādin: Material quality is (you have admitted) known as a real and ultimate fact. Feeling, too, is known as such. Now, is material quality one thing and feeling another?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is the person known also in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, as material quality is known?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then, is material quality one thing, person another thing?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be admitted.

Theravādin: Acknowledge the refutation: If material quality and feeling are both known as real and ultimate facts, and yet are two different things, then analogously, if the person and material quality are both known as real and ultimate facts, they, good sir, can equally be two different things. Your position in admitting the first pair of propositions, but not the second pair, is false. If you cannot admit the second pair, neither should you have admitted the first pair. Your position is false.

The same argument is then applied to the case of each of the other three khandhas, substituted for feeling:

The permutations of the five aggregates (khandhas) are proceeded with as in Kv1.1.130, thus: :

  • Material quality and feeling
  • the person and material quality

are replaced by:

  • feeling and perception
  • The person and feeling

next by:

  • feeling and the coefficients
  • the person and feeling

next by:

  • feeling and consciousness
  • the person and feeling

after which perception, coefficients, and consciousness in their own turn replace feeling:

Next each of the 12 Āyatanas, the 18 Dhātus, and the 22 Indriyas is used in turn to illustrate the analogy, thus: :

  • organ of sight and organ of hearing
  • the person and organ of sight

etc. is the first grouping in the Āyatana-analogies, the last grouping in the Indriya-analogies being:

  • the controlling power of “one who has come to know,” and that of “the coming to know,”
  • the person and the controlling power of “one who has come to know.”

Puggalavādin: Material quality is known you have admitted in the sense of a real and ultimate fact. Is material quality one thing, feeling another thing?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Was it said by the Exalted One: “There is the person who works for his own good?” And is material quality known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Well then, is material quality one thing, the person another?

Theravādin: No, that cannot truly be said.

Puggalavādin: Acknowledge the rejoinder: If material quality and feeling are known as real, ultimate facts, and are different things, then why are not “the person’—a term used by the Exalted One—and material quality also two different things? Your position is false. You admit the truth of the first pair of propositions, but not that of the analogous second pair. If you deny the truth of the second pair, you should not admit the truth of the analogous first pair.

The discourse may be completed as in Kv1.1.3Kv1.1.16:

The “wheel” (cakka) of all the other ultimate facts—other khandhas, āyatanas, etc—now revolves about this quotation, as it revolved in Kv1.1.131Kv1.1.135:

Comparison by the Fourfold Method

Theravādin: Is “the person” known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: (i) Is material quality the person?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said.

Theravādin: Acknowledge the refutation: If the former proposition is true, you should also, good sir, have admitted the latter. If you cannot affirm that material quality is the person, neither should you have admitted that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact. Your position is false.

Theravādin: You admit the former proposition, (ii) Now, is the person known as being in material quality? (Suffering) Is it known as being apart from material quality? (iv) Is material quality known as being in the person?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said.

Theravādin: Acknowledge the refutation: If the person is indeed known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then, good sir, you should also have admitted one of these other three propositions. Your position is false. If you cannot admit any one of those three propositions as to where or how the person is known, then indeed, good sir, you should not assent to the original proposition—that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.

The “wheel” is then turned for all the remaining “real and ultimate facts” in relation to “person” … is feeling the person? … is the person … in feeling? … apart from feeling? … is feeling … in the person? … is the organ of sight the person? … and so on.

Puggalavādin: Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Theravādin: It is not so known.

Puggalavādin: (ii) Is material quality the person?

Theravādin: No, that cannot truly be admitted.

Puggalavādin: Acknowledge the rejoinder: If the person is not so known as you state, then you should have admitted that material quality and person are the same. If you cannot admit the latter proposition, neither can you assert the former …

Puggalavādin: Is the person not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Theravādin: It is not so known.

Puggalavādin: (ii) Is the person known as being in material quality? (Suffering) Or as being apart from material quality? (iv) Or is material quality known as being in the person?

Theravādin: No, that cannot truly be admitted.

Puggalavādin: Acknowledge the rejoinder: If the person is not known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then, good sir, you should admit that it is known in association with material quality as advanced in the other propositions. If one of these cannot be admitted, neither should you have asserted the first proposition.

This and the preceding section may be completed as in Kv1.1.3Kv1.1.16:

The “wheel” is then turned as indicated inKv1.1.140Kv1.1.141:

Associated Characteristics

Theravādin: Is “the person” known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is “the person” related, or is it absolute? Is “the person” conditioned, or is it unconditioned? Is it eternal? or is it temporal? Has it external features? or is it without any?

Puggalavādin: No, these things cannot truly be predicated about it … Continue as in Kv1.1.1: “Acknowledge the refutation,” etc:

Puggalavādin: Is “the person” unknown in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Theravādin: It is.

Puggalavādin: Was it said by the Exalted One: “There is the person who works for his own good” … ?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Is the person related, or is it absolute? conditioned or unconditioned? eternal or temporal? with the marks or without them?

Theravādin: No, these things cannot truly be predicated about it.

Puggalavādin: Acknowledge, etc … complete as in Kv1.1.2 and in Kv1.1.3Kv1.1.16: .

To clear the Meaning of the Terms

Theravādin: Is “the person” known, and conversely, is that which is known the person?

Puggalavādin: The person is known. Conversely, of that which is known some is “person,” some is not “person.”

Theravādin: Do you admit this with respect to the subject also: of that which is person, is some known and some not known?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said … continue as before.

Theravādin: Does “person” mean a reality and conversely?

Puggalavādin: “Person” is a reality. Conversely, reality means in part person, in part not person.

Theravādin: Do you admit this with respect to the subject also: that “person means in part reality, in part non-reality”?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Does the person exist, and conversely?

Puggalavādin: The person exists. Conversely, of the existent some is person, some is not person.

Theravādin: Of the person is some existent, some non-existent?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Query repeated with an equivalent major term.

Theravādin: Is person something that is, and conversely?

Reply similar to the foregoing:

Theravādin: Does the person exist, and conversely, is that which exists not all person?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Can you substitute “not exist(s)” for “exist(s)”?

Puggalavādin: No …

Inquiry into Term-or-Concept

Theravādin: Is one who has material quality in the sphere of matter a “person”?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is one who experiences desires of sense in the sphere of sense-desire “a person”?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Are those who have material qualities in the sphere of matter “persons”?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Are those who experience desires of sense in the sphere of sense-desire “persons”?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said … .

Theravādin: Is one who is without material qualities in the sphere of the Immaterial a “person”?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is one who experiences desires of sense in the sphere of sense-desire a person?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Are those who have no material qualities in the Immaterial sphere “persons”?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Are those who experience sense-desires in the sphere of of sense-desire “persons”?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be admitted.

Theravādin: According to you one who has material qualities in the sphere of matter is a “person”; one who has no material qualities in the Immaterial sphere is a “person”: does anyone deceasing from the Rūpa sphere get reborn in the Immaterial sphere?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is the “person” who had material qualites then annihilated, and does the person with no material qualities come into being?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be admitted …

Queries repeated, substituting “being” for “person.”:

Theravādin: Applying the terms “physical frame,” and “body” indiscriminately to our body, are these identical, one in meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the same in origin?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Are the terms “personal entity,” or “soul,” as applied without distinction to the individual, identical, one in meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the same in origin?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is “physical frame” different from “personal entity” (or “individual”)?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is “soul” one thing, “body” another?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said.

Theravādin: Acknowledge the refutation: If there be this identity and coincidence between “physical frame” and “body”; and if there be this identity and coincidence between “individual” (or personal entity) and “soul”; if, further, “physical frame” is different from “individual” (or personal entity), then indeed, good sir, it should also have been admitted that “soul” is different from “body.”

You are wrong in (1) admitting the identity between “physical frame” and “body,” (2) admitting the identity between “personal entity and “soul,” (3) admitting the difference between “physical frame” and “personal entity,” while (4) you deny the difference between “body” and “soul.”

If you cannot admit (4), neither should you have admitted (1), (2), (8). You cannot admit (1), (2), (8), while denying (4).

Puggalavādin: Are the terms “physical frame” and “body” applied to body without distinction of meaning, identical, one in meaning, the same, the same in denotation, the same in origin?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Was it said by the Exalted One:

“There is the person who works for his own good?”

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Is “physical frame” one thing, “individual” (or “personal entity”) another?

Theravādin: No, that cannot truly be said.

Puggalavādin: Acknowledge my rejoinder: If there be this identity and coincidence between “physical frame” and “body” and if it was said by the Exalted One “There is the individual, etc … ,” then indeed, good sir, it should also have been admitted that “physical frame” is one thing and “individual” or “personal entity” another. You are wrong in admitting the first two propositions and denying the third. If you cannot admit the third, neither should you have admitted the first two … complete the discourse as in 1.1.31.1.16: .

Examination continued by way of Rebirth

Theravādin: Does a person run on (or transmigrate) from this world to another and from another world to this?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is it the identical person who transmigrates from this world to another and from another world to this?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot be truly said … complete as above.

Theravādin: Then is it a different person who transmigrates …

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said … complete as above.

Theravādin: Then is it both the identical and also a different person who transmigrates … ?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Then is it neither the identical person, nor yet a different person who transmigrates … ?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Is it the identical, a different, both identical and also different, neither identical, nor different person who transmigrates … ?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Puggalavādin: Then is it wrong to say, “The person transmigrates from this world to another world, and from another world to this?”

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Was it not said by the Exalted One:

“When he has run from birth to birth seven times and reached the last, that being shall make an end of suffering, by wearing every fetter down.”

Is the Suttanta thus?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Then surely the person does transmigrate from this world to another world and from another world to this. Again repeating his first question: was it not said by the Exalted One:

“Without a known beginning, O bhikkhus, is the course of rebirth (saṃsāra); unknowable is the origin of beings who, shrouded in ignorance and bound by the fetters of natural desire, run on transmigrating.”

Is the Suttanta thus?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Then surely the person does transmigrate as was said.

Theravādin: —Does the person transmigrate from this world, etc.?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Does the identical person so transmigrate?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said … complete as usual.

Theravādin: I repeat my question.

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there any person who after being human becomes a deva?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is the identical man the deva?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said … complete as usual.

Theravādin: I repeat, is the identical man the deva?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Now you are wrong to admit as true that, having been man he becomes deva, or having been deva he becomes man, and again that, having become man, a deva is different from a human being, and yet that this identical person transmigrates …

Surely if the identical person, without becoming different, transmigrates when deceasing hence to another world, there will then be no dying; destruction of life will cease to take place. There is action (karma); there is action’s effect; there is the result of deeds done. But when good and bad acts are maturing as results, you say that the very same person transmigrates—this is wrong.

Theravādin: Does the self-same person transmigrate from this world to another, from another world to this?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there anyone who, having been human, becomes a Yakkha, a Peta, an inmate of purgatory, a beast, for example a camel, an ox, a mule, a pig, a buffalo?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Does the self-same human become anyone of these, say, a buffalo?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said … complete the refutation as usual.

Theravādin: I repeat: is the self-same human the buffalo?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: But all this, namely, that having been man, he becomes a buffalo, or having been buffalo he becomes man, again, that having become a man, he is quite different from the buffalo, and yet that the self-same person goes on transmigrating, is wrong … complete as usual.

Surely if the identical person, when deceasing from this world and being reborn in another, is nowise different, then there will be no dying, nor will taking life be possible. There is action; there is action’s effect; there is the result of deeds done. But when good and bad acts are maturing as results, you say that the identical person transmigrates—this is wrong.

Theravādin: You say that the identical person transmigrates. Is there anyone who having been a noble becomes a brahmin?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is the noble in question the very same as the brahmin in question?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said … complete the discourse.

Theravādin: Is there anyone who, having been noble, becomes reborn in the middle, or in the lower class?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is the noble in question the very same as the person so reborn?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

The other alternatives, substituting “brahmin,” etc., in turn for “noble,” are treated similarly.

Theravādin: You say that the identical person transmigrates … Is then one who has had hand or foot cut off, or hand and foot, or ear or nose, or both cut off, or finger or thumb cut off, or who is hamstrung, the same as he was before? Or is one whose fingers are bent or webbed the same as he was before? Or is one afflicted with leprosy, skin disease, dry leprosy, consumption, epilepsy, the same as he was before? Or is one who has become a camel, ox, mule, pig, buffalo, the same as he was before?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Puggalavādin: Is it wrong to say: “The identical person transmigrates from this world to another, etc.?”

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: But is not one who has “attained the stream” (i.e. the first path towards salvation), when he is deceasing from the world of men, and is reborn in the world of devas, a stream-winner there also?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: But if this man, reborn as deva, is a stream-winner also in that world, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say: “The identical person transmigrates from this world to another.” …

Theravādin: Assuming that one who has attained the stream, when deceasing from the world of men, is reborn in the world of devas, does the identical person transmigrate from this world to another and from another world to this in just that manner?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is such a stream-winner, when reborn in deva-world, a man there also?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said … complete the “refutation”.

Theravādin: Does the identical person transmigrate from this world to another, etc.?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is the transmigrator not different, still present?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I repeat, is the transmigrator not different, still present?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: If he has lost a hand, a foot, … if he is diseased … if he is an animal … is he the same as before?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said … complete.

Theravādin: Does the identical person transmigrate? …

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Does he transmigrate with his corporeal qualities?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Think again! Does he transmigrate with these?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Are soul and body the same?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Does he transmigrate with feeling, with perception, with mental coefficients, with consciousness?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Think again … does he transmigrate with consciousness?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is soul the same as body?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: If, as you say, the identical person transmigrates, … does he transmigrate without corporeal qualities, without feeling, perception, mental coefficients, without consciousness?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said…

Theravādin: Think again … without corporeal qualities … without consciousness?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is then the soul one thing, the body another?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be admitted …

Theravādin: If, as you say, the identical person transmigrates, … do the material qualities transmigrate?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be admitted …

Theravādin: Think again …

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: But is this soul (x) the same as this body (x)?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Does feeling … or perception … or do mental coefficients … or does consciousness transmigrate?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Think again … does consciousness transmigrate?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: But is this soul (x) the same as this body (x)?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Then, the identical person, according to you, transmigrating … does none of the above-named five aggregates transmigrate?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Think again …

Puggalavādin: Yes, they do.

Theravādin: Is, then, soul one thing, body another?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

With the dissolution of the aggregates,
If then the “person” dissolves,
This is the view of annihilationism,
Rejected by the Buddha.

With the dissolution of the aggregates,
If then the “person” does not dissolve,
That person is eternal,
Equivalent to Nibbāna.

Derivatives

Examination continued by Way of Derivative Concepts

Theravādin: Is the concept of person derived from the corporeal qualities?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Are material qualities impermanent, conditioned, do they happen through a cause? Are they liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: But has person also any or all of these qualities?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Or is the concept of person derived from feeling, from perception, from mental coefficients, from consciousness?

Puggalavādin: Yes (to each “aggregate” in succession).

Theravādin: Is any mental aggregate impermanent, conditioned? does it happen through a cause? is it liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: But has person also any or all of these qualities?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: You said that the concept of person is derived from material qualities. Is the concept of blue-green person derived from blue-green material qualities?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Or is the concept of yellow, red, white, visible, invisible, resisting, or unresisting person derived from corresponding material qualities, respectively?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Is the concept of person derived from feeling?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is the concept of good person derived from good feeling?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I repeat my question.

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Now, does feeling entail result or fruit, fruit that is desirable, pleasing, gladdening, unspotted, a happy result, and such as conveys happiness?

Puggalavādin: No.

Theravādin: I repeat my question.

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: But does “good person” entail result or fruit of like nature with the above?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: If the concept of person is derived from feeling, is the concept of bad person derived from bad feeling?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Now does bad feeling entail result or fruit, fruit that is undesirable, unpleasing, spotted, an unhappy result, and such as conveys unhappiness?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: But does bad person entail result or fruit of like nature to the above?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: If the concept of person is derived from feeling, is the concept of indeterminate person—one to be termed neither good nor bad—derived from indeterminate feeling?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Is the concept I repeat of an ethically indeterminate person derived from an ethically indeterminate feeling?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is indeterminate feeling impermanent, conditioned? Does it happen through a cause? Is it liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Has an ethically indeterminate person any or all of these qualities?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Is the concept of person derived from any of the other three aggregates: perception, mental co-efficients, consciousness?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Taking the last: is the concept of good person derived from good consciousness?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said.

Theravādin: Now does good consciousness entail result or fruit—fruit that is desirable, pleasing, gladdening, unspotted, a happy result, such as conveys happiness?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: And does a good person also entail the like?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: You say that the concept of person is derived from consciousness—is the concept of bad person derived from bad consciousness?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I repeat is the concept of bad person derived from bad consciousness?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Now does bad consciousness entail result or fruit, fruit that is undesirable, etc. the reverse of what is entailed by good consciousness?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: And does a bad person also entail the like?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Again, since you admit that the concept of person is derived from any or all of the aggregates, e.g. consciousness, is the concept of an ethically indeterminate person derived from indeterminate consciousness?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I repeat my question.

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: But is the ethically indeterminate person impermanent, conditioned, arisen through a cause, liable to perish … to change?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Ought it to be said that a person who sees is derived from sight (or eye)?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Ought it to be said that, when sight (or eye) ceases, the seeing person ceases?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

The pair of queries is applied, with like replies, to the other four senses, and also to the sensus communis, mano.

Theravādin: Ought it to be said that a person of wrong views is derived from wrong views?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Ought it to be said that when the wrong views cease to exist, the person having wrong views ceases to exist?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Ought it, again, to be said that when any other parts of the Wrong Eightfold Path cease to exist, the person, said by you to be derived from that part, ceases to exist?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Similarly, ought it to be said that a person of right views, or right aspiration, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right endeavour, right mindfulness, right samādhi, is derived from the corresponding part of the Eightfold Path?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Ought it, again, to be said that when the given part ceases, the person so derived ceases?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Is the concept of person derived from material qualities and feeling?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then could the concept of a double person be derived from the pair of aggregates?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Or could the concept of a double person be derived from material quality coupled with any of the other three aggregates … or the concept of five persons be derived from all five aggregates?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Is the concept of person derived from the organs of sight (eye) and hearing (ear)?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then could the concept “two persons” be derived from the two organs? … and so on as in Kv1.1.183, to include all the twelve āyatanas—i.e. organs and objects of sense and the organ and object of sense co-ordination, mano, dhamma: .)

Theravādin: Is the concept of person derived from the elements of sight (or eye) and hearing (or ear)?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Could the concept of a double person be derived from these two?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Is the concept of person derived from the element of sight and any other of the eighteen elements?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Could the concept of eighteen persons be derived from the eighteen elements?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot be truly said …

Theravādin: Is the concept of person derived from the controlling powers—eye and ear?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Could the concept of a double person be derived from these two?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Could the concept of person be derived from the controlling power, eye, and from any other of the twenty-two controlling powers?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Could the concept of twenty-two persons be derived from these?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Is the concept of one person derived from the becoming of one aggregate?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Could the concept of four persons be derived from the becoming of the four (mental) aggregates?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Or again, by your assenting to the former question, could the concept of five persons be derived from the becoming of the five aggregates (mental and bodily)?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Is there only one person in the becoming of one aggregate?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then are five persons in the becoming of all five aggregates?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Is the concept of person derived from material qualities just as the idea of shadow is derived from a tree? And just as the idea of its shadow is derived from the tree, and both tree and shadow are impermanent, is it even so that the concept of person is derived from material qualities, both person and material qualities being impermanent?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Are material qualities one thing and the concept of person derived therefrom another, in the same way as the tree is one thing, and the idea of shadow derived from it another?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Is the concept of person derived from material qualities just as the notion “villager” is derived from village? And if that is so, is material quality one thing, person another, just as village is one thing, villager another?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Or—just as a kingdom is one thing, a king another?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: A jail is not a jailer, but a jailer is he who has the jail. Is it just so with material qualities and one who has them? And accordingly, just as the jail is one thing, the jailer another, are not material qualities one thing, and one who has them another?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Consciousness

Theravādin: Is there the notion of person to each moment of consciousness?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Does the person undergo birth, decay, death, disease and rebirth in each moment of consciousness?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: When the second moment of consciousness in a process of thought arises, is it wrong to say: “It is the same, or something different”?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then, when the second moment arises, is it not also wrong to say: “It is a boy” or “it is a girl”?

Puggalavādin: It may be so said.

Theravādin: Now acknowledge the refutation: If at the second moment of consciousness it could not be said, “It is the same or something different,” then indeed, good sir, neither can it be said, at that moment, that “It is a boy, or a girl.” What you say, namely, that the former may not, the latter may be affirmed, is false. If the former proposition may not be affirmed, the second cannot be affirmed. Your rejecting the one and accepting the other is wrong.

According to you it is wrong to say, when the second moment of consciousness arises, “It is the same or something different.” Can it not then, at such a moment, be said: “It is male or female, layman or religious, man or deva.”

Puggalavādin: Yes, it can be … complete as in Kv1.1.194: .

The Five Senses

Puggalavādin: Is it wrong to say: “The person or person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?

Theravādin: Yes, it is wrong.

Puggalavādin: Is it not the case that when someone sees something by means of something, a certain “he” sees a certain “it” by a certain “means”?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: But if that is so, then surely it should be said that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Analogous questions are asked concerning the other four senses. Again: :

Puggalavādin: Is it not the case that when someone knows something by means of something, a certain “he” knows a certain “it” by a certain “means”? If so, then surely it may be said that the person is known in a real and ultimate sense.

Theravādin: Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is it not the case that when someone does not see something by means of something, a certain “he” does not see a certain “it” by a certain “means”?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then it is equally the case that the person is not known in a real and ultimate sense.

Analogous questions are asked concerning the other four senses and cognition generally.

Puggalavādin: Is it wrong to say the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Was it not said by the Exalted One:

“O bhikkhus, I see beings deceasing and being reborn by the purified vision of the eye celestial, surpassing that of men. I discern beings in spheres sublime or base, fair or frightful, of happy or woeful doom, faring according to their actions”?

Is the Suttanta thus?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Surely then the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Theravādin: Granting that the Exalted One said that which is quoted, is that a reason for affirming that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Does the Exalted One, by the purified vision of the eye celestial surpassing that of man, see visible objects, and does he also see the person?

Puggalavādin: He sees visible objects.

Theravādin: Are visible objects the person? Do they end one life and reappear? Do they fare according to Karma?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I repeat my former question.

Puggalavādin: He does see the person.

Theravādin: Is then the person visible object? Is it object of sight, objective element of sight, blue, green, yellow, red, white? Is it cognizable by sight? Does it impinge on the eye? Does it enter the avenue of sight?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I repeat my former question.

Puggalavādin: He does see both.

Theravādin: Are both then visible objects? Both objective element of sight? Are both blue, green, yellow, red, white? Are both cognizable by sight? Do both impinge on the eye? Do both enter the avenue of sight? Do both disappear, reappear in rebirths, faring according to Karma?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Ethical Goodness

Examination continued by Reference to Human Action, called also “The Section on Ethical Goodness”

Puggalavādin: Are ethically good and bad actions known to exist?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Are both the doer of ethically good and bad deeds, and he who causes them to be done known to exist?

Theravādin: No, that cannot truly be said … complete in the usual way, viz., that the former admission involves acceptance of what is denied.

Theravādin: Admitting that ethically good and bad deeds are known to exist, do you assert that the doer and the instigator are also known to exist?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then is he who made the doer, or inspired the instigator, known to exist?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I ask you again.

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: But if the one be thus maker, etc., of the other, is there then no making an end of suffering, no cutting off the cycle of life renewed, no final Nibbāna without residual stuff of life?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: If good and bad deeds are known to take place, is the doer, is the instigator, of those deeds known to exist?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is the person known to exist, and his maker or inspirer also?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I repeat my question: if good and bad deeds …

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then is Nibbāna also known to exist, and the maker and the maker’s maker as well?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Then, again, if these things be as you say, is the earth known to exist, and its maker and his maker also?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Or the ocean?—or Sineru, chief of mountains?—or water?—or fire?—or air?—or grass, brush, and forest? and the maker of each and his maker also?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Again, if good and bad deeds being known to exist, doer and instigator are also known to exist, are those deeds one thing, and doer and instigator quite another thing?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Puggalavādin: Is the effect of ethically good and bad deeds known to take place?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Is one who experiences the effect of such deeds known to exist?

Theravādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Admitting that both these propositions are true, is one who enjoys the first-named person known to exist?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I repeat the question.

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: If the one and the other be so, is there no making an end of suffering, no cutting off the cycle of life renewed, no final Nibbāna without residual stuff of life?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Again, admitting both those propositions to be true, does the person exist, and the enjoyer of that person also exist?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Again, admitting both those propositions to be true, is Nibbāna known to exist, and one who experiences it also?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Or again, is the earth, the ocean, Sineru chief of mountains, water, fire, air, grass, brush, and forest, known to exist, and one who experiences any of them known also to exist?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Or finally is the result of ethically good and bad deeds one thing and he who experiences those results another?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Puggalavādin: Is celestial happiness known to exist?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Is one who is experiencing celestial happiness known to exist?

Theravādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Assuming both propositions to be true, is one who enjoys that experiencer known to exist?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I repeat the question.

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: If the one and the other be so, is there no making an end of suffering, no cutting off the cycle of life, no final Nibbāna without residual stuff of life?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Again, assuming both those propositions to be true, is the person known to exist and the enjoyer of the person also?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Again, assuming that celestial happiness and those enjoying it are both known to exist, is Nibbāna known, and one enjoying it known also to exist?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Or again, assuming as before, are the earth, the ocean, Sineru chief of mountains, water, fire, air, grass, brush, and forest known to exist and those enjoying them?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Or again, assuming as before, is celestial happiness one thing, the enjoyer another thing?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Puggalavādin: Is human happiness known to exist?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Is the enjoyer of human happiness known to exist?

Theravādin: No, that cannot truly be said. , . .

Theravādin: Is both human happiness and the enjoyer of it known to exist?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is one who enjoys the enjoyer known to exist?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I repeat my question.

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: If the one and the other be so, is there no making an end of suffering, no cutting off the cycle of life, no final Nibbāna without residual stuff of life?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

The dialogue is then completed, as in 1.1.205, on celestial happiness.

Puggalavādin: Is the misery of the lower planes known to exist?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Is the experiencer of that misery known to exist?

Theravādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Do you admit both these propositions?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is the enjoyer of the sufferer of that misery known to exist?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I repeat my question.

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: If the one and the other be so, is there no making an end of suffering, etc.? complete in full as in Kv1.1.205, Kv1.1.207: .

Theravādin: Is the misery of purgatory known? Complete as in Kv1.1.204, Kv1.1.205, Kv1.1.207.

Theravādin: Are ethically good and bad acts (karmas) known to exist? And the doer of them also? And the instigator also? And the enjoyer of the effect—is he also known to exist?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is he who does the acts the same as he who experiences the effect?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I repeat my question.

Puggalavādin: Yes

Theravādin: Then, are happiness and misery self-caused?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Then, admitting you still assent to my first propositions, is the doer a different person from the enjoyer of the effect?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I repeat my question.

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then, are happiness and misery caused by another?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Admitting you still assent to the first propositions, does the same and another do the deeds, does the same and another enjoy (the results)?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I repeat my question.

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then is happiness and is misery both self-caused and produced by another?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Admitting that you still assent to the first propositions, does neither the same person both do the deeds and experience the results, nor one person do the deeds and another experience the results?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I repeat my question.

Puggalavādin: Yes, neither the same, nor two different persons.

Theravādin: Then are happiness and misery not self-causing nor caused by something else?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Admitting, finally, that you still assent to the first propositions, namely, that ethically good and bad actions; as well as the doer of them, and the instigator of the doer, are known to exist, I have now asked you four further questions:

  1. Is he who does the act the same as he who experiences the effect?
  2. Are doer and experiencer two different persons?
  3. Are they the same and also different persons?
  4. Are they neither the same nor different persons?

Theravādin: You have answered to each: No. I have then repeated the question. You have then said: Yes. I have then put four questions:

  1. Are happiness and misery self-caused?
  2. Are they the work of another?
  3. Are they both one and the other?
  4. Are they, arising through a cause, self-caused, or the work of another?

And you have replied: No …

Puggalavādin: Is there such a thing as karma (action taking effect)?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Is there such a thing as a maker of karma?

Theravādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Is there such a thing as both karma and the maker of karma?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there a maker of that maker?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I repeat the question.

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then if the one and the other exist, is there no making an end of suffering, no cutting of the cycle of life, no final Nibbāna without residual stuff of life?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Again, since you assent to both the first propositions, is there both a person and a maker of the person?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Or … is there both Nibbāna and a maker thereof? … or the earth, ocean, Sineru, water, fire, air, grass, brush and forest, and the maker thereof?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: … Or is karma one thing, the maker of it another?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Puggalavādin: Is there such a thing as result of action?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Is there such a thing as an enjoyer of the result?

Theravādin: No, that cannot truly be said. .

Theravādin: Do you maintain then that there are both results and enjoyer thereof?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there an enjoyer of that enjoyer?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I repeat my question.

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then, if this and that be so, is there no making an end of suffering, no … etc. complete in full similarly to Kv1.1.214, and ending:

Theravādin: You maintaining that there is both result and enjoyer thereof, is then result one thing, and the enjoyer of it another?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said … complete as usual.

Supernormal Power

Examination into “person” continued by reference to Superintellectual Power.

Puggalavādin: Is it wrong to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Have there not been those who could transform themselves by magic potency?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: if that be so, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.” Again, have there not been those who could hear sounds by the element of celestial hearing, or know the mind of another, or remember previous lives, or see visible objects by the celestial eye, or realize the destruction of the “defilements”?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: If these things be so, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.”

Theravādin: Granting that there have been those who could transform themselves by magic potency, is it for that reason that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: When one has through magic potency transformed himself, was he then the personal entity, and not when not so transforming himself?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

This question is asked, and so answered, in the case of the other five modes, of super-intellectual faculty named above:

Appeal To The Suttas

Puggalavādin: Is it wrong to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Is there not one whom we call mother?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: If there be, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.” Again, is there not one whom we call father, are there not brothers, sisters, nobles, brahmins, merchants, serfs, householders, religious, devas, humane?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: If there be, then indeed, good sir, it is right to say the person is known etc.

Theravādin: Granting there are mothers, fathers, etc.,is it for this reason that yon insist thus respecting the personal entity?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there anyone who, not having been a mother, becomes a mother?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there anyone who, not having been a personal entity, becomes one?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

This pair of questions is then put concerning “father,” “brother” … “deva,” “human,” and answered as above.

Theravādin: Granting the existence of a mother, is it for this reason that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there anyone who, having been a mother, is no longer a mother?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there anyone who, having been a personal entity, is no longer one?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

This last pair of questions is then put with respect to “father” and the rest, and answered as above.

Puggalavādin: Is it wrong to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Is there no such thing as a “stream-winner” (or one who has entered the first stage of the way to salvation)?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: If there be such a thing, then indeed, good sir, it is right to assent to the original preposition. Again, is there no such thing as a “once-returner,” a “no-returner,” an arahant, one who is freed in both ways, one who is emancipated by understanding, one who has the testimony within himself, one who has arrived at right views, one who is emancipated by faith, one who marches along with wisdom, one who marches along with faith?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Then surely, good sir, it is right to affirm the first proposition.

Theravādin: Granted that there is such a thing as a “stream-winner,” is it for that reason that the “person” is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there anyone who, not having been a streamwinner, is one now?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there anyone who, not having been a “person,” is one now?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Again, granted that there is such an one as a stream-winner, and that this is the reason for your affirmation as to the personal entity, is there anyone who having been a stream-winner, is so no longer?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there anyone who, not having been a person, is one now?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

These questions are now put regarding the other designations, and are answered similarly:

Puggalavādin: If as you say it be wrong to assert “the person is known, etc., … ” are there not the accepted terms of “the Four Pairs of men,” “the Eight Individuals”?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: But if that be so, surely it is right to speak of the “person” as known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.

Theravādin: Granting that there are the Four, the Eight, is it for this reason you assert the first proposition?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Do the Four, the Eight, appear because of the Buddha’s appearing?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Does the “person” appear because of the Buddha’s appearing?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I repeat the question.

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then at the Buddha’s final Nibbāna, is the “person “annihilated, so that no personal entity exists?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: The person you say is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact—is the person conditioned?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Is the person unconditioned?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Is he neither?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I repeat my question.

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Apart from the conditioned or the unconditioned, is there another, a third alternative?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I repeat my question.

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: But was it not said by the Exalted One:

“There are, bhikkhus, these two irreducible categories—what are the two? The irreducible category of the conditioned, the irreducible category of the unconditioned. These are the two.”

Is the Suttanta thus?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Hence it is surely wrong to say that apart from the conditioned and the unconditioned, there is another, a third alternative.

Theravādin (continues): You say that the person is neither conditioned nor unconditioned? Are then the conditioned, the unconditioned, the person, entirely different things?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Are the aggregates conditioned, Nibbāna unconditioned, the person neither conditioned nor unconditioned?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then are the aggregates, Nibbāna, and the person, three entirely different things?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

The last two questions are then applied to each aggregate taken separately: —material qualities, feeling, perception, mental co-efficients, consciousness: .

Theravādin: Is the genesis of the person apparent, and its passing away also, and is its duration distinctively apparent?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then is the person conditioned?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: It was said by the Exalted One:

Bhikkhus, there are these three characteristics of the conditioned: of conditioned things the genesis is apparent, the passing away is apparent, the duration amidst change is apparent.

Hence if these three are characteristics of the person, this is also conditioned. Are these three characteristics not apparent in the person?

Puggalavādin: No, they are not apparent.

Theravādin: Then is the person unconditioned?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: It was said by the Exalted One:

Bhikkhus, there are these three characteristics of the unconditioned: of unconditioned things, bhikkhus, the genesis is not apparent, the passing away is not apparent, the duration amidst change is not apparent.”

Now if all these as you say do not characterize the notion of “person”, the person is unconditioned.

Theravādin: The person who has attained final Nibbāna, does he exist in the Goal, or does he not exist therein?

Puggalavādin: He exists in the Goal.

Theravādin: Is then the person who has finally attained eternal?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Is the person who has attained final Nibbāna and does not exist in the Goal annihilated?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: On what does the person depend in order to persist?

Puggalavādin: He persists through dependence on coming-to-be.

Theravādin: Is the state of coming-to-be impermanent, conditioned, arisen through a cause, liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is the person also impermanent, conditioned, arisen through a cause, liable to perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to change?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Puggalavādin: Is it wrong to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Is there no one who, on feeling pleasurable feeling, knows that he is feeling it?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Surely, if that be so, good sir, it is right to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact” … and if he, on feeling painful feeling, knows that he is feeling it—you admit this?—it is right to say “the person is known,” etc. So also for neutral feeling.

Theravādin: I note what you affirm. Now is it for this reason that you maintain the person to be known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then is one who, on feeling pleasurable feeling, knows he is feeling it, a personal entity, and is one who, on that occasion, does not know, not a personal entity?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: You deny this also in the case of painful and neutral feeling?

Puggalavādin: Yes, that cannot truly be said, …

Theravādin: But you maintain, because of this self-awareness, that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is then pleasurable feeling one thing and the self-conscious enjoyer another?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Same query and answer in the case of painful and neutral feelings.

Puggalavādin: You deny that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact: Is there then no one who may be occupied in contemplating the concept of body with respect to his physical frame?

Theravādin: Yes.

… or in contemplating the concept of feeling, or consciousness, or certain mental properties with respect to these in himself, respectively?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Then surely, good sir, it is right to say as I do with respect to the person.

Theravādin: Granting the carrying out by anyone of the four applications in mindfulness, is it for this reason that you say as you do with respect to the personal entity?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Then is anyone when so engaged a person, and not, when he is not so engaged?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Or again, granting as above … is “body” one thing, the contemplator another? and so for “feeling,” etc.?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Is the person known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Was it not said by the Exalted One:

“Mogharāja! look upon the world
As empty, being ever mindful.
Reject views of self.
So you shall overcome death;
Regarding the world this way
The king of death shall see you no more.

Is it thus in the Suttanta?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Hence it is surely wrong to say that the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.

Theravādin: Is it the person here who” looks upon”?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Does he contemplate with or without material qualities?

Puggalavādin: With them.

Theravādin: Is that soul the same as that body?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: But if he contemplates without material qualities, is that soul quite, different from that body?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: I ask again is it the person who contemplates?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Does he contemplate when he has gone within, or does he contemplate from without the organism?

Puggalavādin: He contemplates when he has gone within.

Theravādin: Is that soul that body?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Supposing he contemplates from without, is the soul one thing, the body another?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Puggalavādin: Is it wrong to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact”?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Was not the Exalted One a speaker of truth, a speaker in season, a speaker of facts, a speaker of words that are right, that are not wrong, that are not ambiguous?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Now it was said by the Exalted One:

“There is the person who works for his own good.”

Is the Suttanta thus?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Hence surely the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.

… again, it was said by the Exalted One:

“There is one person, bhikkhus, who, being reborn in this world, is born for the good, for the happiness of many, to show compassion on the world, for the advantage, the good, the happiness of devas and of men.

Is the Suttanta thus?

Theravādin: Yes.

Puggalavādin: Hence surely the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.

Theravādin: Granting this, and also the veracity, etc., of the Exalted One: it was said by the Exalted One:

“All things are without self.”

Is the Suttanta thus?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Hence surely it is wrong to say the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.

… again, it was said by the Exalted One:

“He does not doubt that misery arises, comes to pass, that misery ceases, passes away, nor is he perplexed thereat. And thereupon independent insight comes herein to him. Now this, Kaccāna, thus far is right views.”

Is the Suttanta thus?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Hence surely it is wrong to say “the person is known,” etc.

Theravādin: … again, was it not said by Bhikkhuni Vajirā to Māra the evil one:

“Why do you fall back on the notion of a ‘being’?
Māra, haven’t you fallen into pernicious views?.
This is a mere bundle of conditions.
Where no ‘being’ is manifest.

“Just like, when the parts are assembled,
The name ‘chariot’ is known,
So when the aggregates are there,
There is the conventional term, ‘a being,’ .

It’s simply suffering that arises,
Suffering that persists, and then fades away.
Nothing except suffering arises;
Nothing except suffering ceases.”?

Is the Suttanta thus?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: … again, did not the venerable Ānanda say to the Exalted One:

“It is said, lord, “the world is empty, the world is empty.” Now in what way, lord, is it meant that the world is empty?

and did not the Exalted One reply:

“Inasmuch, Ānanda, as it is empty of self and of what belongs to self, therefore is the world called empty. And wherein, Ānanda, is it empty of self and of what belongs to self? The eye, Ānanda, is verily empty of self and of what belongs to self, so is visible object and the sense and contact of sight. So are the other organs, and objects of the senses, and the other senses. So is the co-ordinating organ, cognizable objects, mental consciousness and contact. All are empty of self and of what belongs to self. And whatever pleasurable, painful, or neutral feeling arises, in relation to the senses, and the sense-co-ordinating mind, that too is empty of self and of what belongs to self. It is for this, Ānanda, that the world is said to be empty”?

Is the Suttanta thus?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: … again, whereas you affirm that the person is known, etc … and we know the veracity, etc., of the Exalted One, it was said by the Exalted One:

Bhikkhus, if there were self, should I have that which belongs to a self? Or if there were that which belongs to self, should I have a self? In both cases you would reply: “Yes, lord.” But both self and that which belongs to self being in very truth and for ever impossible to be known, then this that is a stage of opinion, namely: “that is the world that is the self, this I shall hereafter become, permanent, constant, eternal, unchangeable—so shall I abide even like unto the Eternal—is not this, bhikkhus, absolutely and entirely a doctrine of fools “Whatever it be not, lord, it surely is, absolutely and entirely a doctrine of fools.””

Is the Suttanta thus?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: … again, it was said by the Exalted One:

“There are these three teachers, Seniya, to be found in the world—who are the three? There is first, Seniya, that kind of teacher who declares that there is a real, persistent self in the life that now is, and in that which is to come; then there is the kind of teacher, Seniya, who declares that there is a real, persistent self in the life that now is, but not a self in a future life; lastly, there is a certain teacher who does not declare that there is a self either in the life that now is, nor in that which is to come. The first, Seniya, of these three is called an Eternalist, the second is called an Annihilationist; the third of these, he, Seniya, is called the teacher, who is Buddha supreme. These are the three teachers to be found in the world.”.

Is the Suttanta thus?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: … again, did the Exalted One speak of “a butter-jar”?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there anyone who can make a jar out of butter?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: … finally, did the Exalted One speak of an oil-jar, a honey-jar, a molasses-jar, a milk-pail, a water-pot, a cup, flask, bowl of water, a “meal provided in perpetuity,” a “constant supply of congey”?

Puggalavādin: Yes.

Theravādin: Is there any supply of congey that is permanent, stable, eternal, not liable to change?

Puggalavādin: No, that cannot truly be said …

Theravādin: Hence it is surely wrong to say “the person is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.”