Points of Controversy
1.10. Of Existence in Immutable Modes
Andhaka: It exists on this wise, it does not exist on that wise.
Theravādin: Does the past, as you describe it, both exist and not exist? You deny, then affirm—for you must affirm. And if this same past both exists and does not exist, then is also existence non-existence and conversely, then is the state of being a state of non-being and conversely, then are “is” and “is not” convertible terms, identical, one in meaning, the same, same in content and in origin. And this of course you do not admit.
Andhaka: The past exists only as past; it does not exist as future, it does not exist as present.
Theravādin: But this still commits you to saying that the same both is and is not, and thus to the same antinomy.
Andhaka: Do you mean then that the past exists also as future and as present, the future also as past and as present, the present also as past and as future—for to this you are committed? Hence I am surely right.
Andhaka: They exist on this wise, they do not exist on that wise.
Theravādin: Here again you are committed to saying “the same both exists and does not exist,” and to the same antinomy as before. Similarly in the case of the other four aggregates—feeling, etc. Again, with reference to how they exist on this wise, and how they do not, when you reply, “he one aggregate, e.g., the bodily, exists as such, but not as any of the four mental aggregates,” you are equally committed to the antinomy stated above.
Andhaka: But this commits you to saying that each aggregate exists equally as any of the other four. Surely then I am right in saying that each aggregate exists in a specific fashion, and not otherwise.